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OPINIONS
CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL OPINION NO. 3ti
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, PLAIN MEANING
RULE, CONTRACTUAL MERGER CLAUSE
AND THE CISG2
Opinion
1. The Parol Evidence Rule has not been incorporated into
the CISG. The CISG governs the role and weight to be
ascribed to contractual writing.
f Editor's Note: While The Pace International Law Review adheres to The
Bluebook Uniform System of Citation, the Law Review has deferred to the
Advisory Council's chosen citation in the interest of the uniformity of their
opinions.
1 To be cited as: CISG-AC Opinion no 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning
Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG, 23 October 2004. Rapporteur: Pro-
fessor Richard Hyland, Rutgers Law School, Camden, NJ, USA.
Adopted by the CISG-AC on its 7th meeting in Madrid with no dissent. Reproduc-
tion of this opinion is authorized.
The opinion is dedicated to the memory of our dear friend, colleague, and teacher
Allan Farnsworth who passed away on 31 January 2005.
PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, Chair
ERIC E. BERGSTEN, MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, ALEJANDRO M. GARRO, Roy M.
GOODE, SERGEI N. LEBEDEV, PILAR PERALES VISCASILLAS, JAN RAMBERG, INGEBORG
SCHWENZER, HIROO SONO, CLAUDE WITZ, Members
LOUKAS A. MISTELIS, Secretary
The CISG-AC is a private initiative supported by the Institute of International
Commercial Law at Pace University School of Law and the Centre for Commercial
Law Studies, Queen Mary, University of London. The International Sales Conven-
tion Advisory Council (CISG-AC) is in place to support understanding of the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) and the promotion and assistance in the uniform interpretation of the
CISG.
At its formative meeting in Paris in June 2001, Prof. Peter Schlechtriem of Frei-
burg University, Germany, was elected Chair of the CISG-AC for a three-year
term. Dr. Loukas A. Mistelis of the Centre for Commercial Studies, Queen Mary,
University of London, was elected Secretary. The CISG-AC has consisted of: Prof.
1
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2. In some common law jurisdictions, the Plain Meaning
Rule prevents a court from considering evidence outside a
seemingly unambiguous writing for purposes of contractual
interpretation. The Plain Meaning Rule does not apply under
the CISG.
3. A Merger Clause, also referred to as an Entire Agreement
Clause, when in a contract governed by the CISG, derogates
from norms of interpretation and evidence contained in the
CISG. The effect may be to prevent a party from relying on
evidence of statements or agreements not contained in the
writing. Moreover, if the parties so intend, a Merger Clause
may bar evidence of trade usages.
Emeritus Eric E. Bergsten, Pace University; Prof. Michael Joachim Bonell, Uni-
versity of Rome La Sapienza; Prof. E. Allan Farnsworth, Columbia University
School of Law; Prof. Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University School of Law; Prof.
Sir Roy M. Goode, Oxford; Prof. Sergei N. Lebedev, Maritime Arbitration Commis-
sion of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Prof.
Jan Ramberg, University of Stockholm, Faculty of Law; Prof. Peter Schlechtriem,
Freiburg University; Prof. Hiroo Sono, Faculty of Law, Hokkaido University; Prof.
Claude Witz, Universitat des Saarlandes and Strasbourg University. Members of
the Council are elected by the Council. At its meeting in Rome in June 2003, the
CISG-AC elected as additional members, Prof. Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Univer-
sidad Carlos III de Madrid, and Prof. Ingeborg Schwenzer, University of Basel.
For more information please contact L.Mistelis@qmul.ac.uk.
2 This opinion is a response to a request by the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law. The questions re-
ferred to the Council were:
1. By holding that the CISG permits a court to abandon the parol evidence
rule, which generally bars 'evidence of any prior agreement' (UCC 2-202),
the Eleventh Circuit has introduced what may be an unnecessary degree
of uncertainty in the drafting of contracts. If the MCC-Marble rule
prevails, there is no certainty that the provisions of even the most care-
fully negotiated and drafted contract will be determinative.
2.... Does the parol evidence rule apply under the CISG? Although the
rule is regarded as substantive, not evidentiary, and thus within the scope
of the CISG, it is arguable that the rule deals with a matter 'not expressly
settled' in the CISG. The applicable law would then be the law of the juris-
diction whose law would 'be applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law' (CISG art. 7(2)), and if such jurisdiction were an Ameri-
can or other common law jurisdiction the parol evidence rule would apply.
3. Does the 'plain meaning rule' apply under the CISG?
4. Would a merger clause invoke the parol evidence rule under the CISG,
regardless of whether the rule would otherwise be applicable?"
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However, in determining the effect of such a Merger Clause,
the parties' statements and negotiations, as well as all other
relevant circumstances shall be taken into account.
Comments
1. Introduction
1.1. Interpretation and Evidence under the CISG
1.1.1. The CISG provides norms and principles for the inter-
pretation and evidence of international sales transactions.
These include Article 8, which generally permits all relevant
circumstances to be considered in the course of contract inter-
pretation, Article 9, which incorporates certain usages into the
contract, and Article 11,3 which indicates that a contract and its
terms may be proved by any means, including by witnesses.
These rules prevail over domestic rules on interpretation and
evidence of contractual agreements. Since these are default
rules, Article 6 permits the parties to derogate from them or
vary their effect.
1.1.2. Article 6 permits the parties to derogate from them or
vary their effect, e.g., by merger clauses. This Opinion considers
some issues that arise when a court or tribunal is asked to de-
termine whether the parties intended by a merger clause to der-
ogate from the Convention's norms governing contract
interpretation.
1.2. The Parol Evidence Rule
1.2.1. The Parol Evidence Rule refers to the principles which
common law courts have developed for the purpose of determin-
ing the role and weight to ascribe to contractual writings. The
basic purpose of these principles is "to preserve the integrity of
written contracts by refusing to allow the admission of [prior]
oral statements or previous correspondence to contradict the
written agreement."4 In order to allow the intent of the writing
to prevail, the judge may exclude what is known as extrinsic or
3 Unless a state has made a reservation under Article 96.
4 Larry DIMATTEO, The Law of International Contracting 212 (2000).
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parol evidence, particularly statements made during the negoti-
ations. The Parol Evidence Rule applies to the general law of
contracts, including the sale of goods law of common law
jurisdictions.5
1.2.2. The Parol Evidence Rule is believed to have developed
as a method for judges to prevent common law juries from ig-
noring credible and reliable written evidence of the contract.
6
The US legal system maintains the right to a jury trial in civil
matters, and most civil jury trials take place in the United
States.7 As a result, the Parol Evidence Rule has become more
important in US law than in other common law systems.
1.2.3. The Parol Evidence Rule comes into play when two cir-
cumstances meet. First, the agreement has been reduced to
writing. Second, one of the parties seeks to present extrinsic or
parol evidence to the fact finder. Extrinsic or parol evidence in-
cludes evidence of the negotiations or of agreements related to
the contractual subject matter which was not incorporated into
the written contract. A typical case involves representations
made during the negotiations by Seller or Seller's representa-
tives regarding the quality of the goods. Under the Parol Evi-
dence Rule, Seller may ask the tribunal to bar introduction of
evidence of any representations not incorporated into the writ-
ten contract.
1.2.4. In English law, the Parol Evidence Rule involves a re-
buttable presumption that the writing was intended to include
6 For example, the Parol Evidence Rule has been incorporated into the sales
law of the US Uniform Commercial Code: "Terms with respect to which the confir-
matory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writ-
ing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to
such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any
prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or
supplemented (a) by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade
(Section 1-303), and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement
of the terms of the agreement." UCC § 2-202.
6 Charles MCCORMICK, Handbook of the Law of Evidence §§ 210-11 (1954).
7 Edward J. IMWINKELRIED, "A Comparative Critique of the Interface be-
tween Hearsay and Expert Opinion in American Evidence Law, 33 Boston College
Law Review 1 (1991) at 34.
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4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss1/3
CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL OPINION NO. 3
all the terms of the contract.8 English courts first examine the
writing to determine whether it was meant to serve as a true
record of the contract.9 Thus, under English law, the party rely-
ing on a writing has the benefit that, when the writing appears
to be complete, it is presumed to represent the complete con-
tract, subject to the other party's right of rebuttal. 10
1.2.5. In US law, the Parol Evidence Rule operates in two
steps.'1 A US court asks first whether the writing was "inte-
grated," meaning whether the writing was intended to re-
present the final expression of the terms it contains. The
parties' notes, or a mere draft of the agreement, for example,
would usually be deemed not to be integrated. A writing signed
by the parties and containing detailed specifications will usu-
ally be found to be integrated. If the writing is integrated,
neither party may introduce parol evidence to contradict the
terms of the writing. If the writing is deemed to be integrated,
the second step is to determine whether it is "completely inte-
grated," namely whether it was intended to represent the com-
plete expression of the parties' agreement. If the writing is
completely integrated, parol evidence may not be introduced ei-
ther to contradict or to supplement the writing's terms.
1.2.6. Different methods are used in US law to determine
whether a writing is completely integrated.12 Some courts en-
gage in a conclusive presumption that a writing fully incorpo-
rates the contract. Other courts presume that the writing is
completely integrated unless, by its terms, it refers to factors
beyond its four corners. Still other courts allow evidence of ex-
trinsic circumstances, though not of the preliminary negotia-
tions, when considering whether the writing is integrated.
Perhaps the most liberal method is that proposed by the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts-all extrinsic evidence, includ-
ing the negotiations, may be considered when determining
whether the parties intended the writing to be the complete and
8 G. H. TREITEL, The Law of Contract, 192 (11th ed. 2003).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 193.
11 See E. Allan FARNSWORTH, Contracts, § 7.3 (3rd ed. 1999).
12 Peter LINZER, "The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol
Evidence Rule," 71 Fordham L. Rev. 799, 805-06 (2002).
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final statement of their obligations. 13 US sales law has adopted
a similarly liberal approach. 14
1.2.7. The Parol Evidence Rule was designed to serve both an
evidentiary and a channeling function, but its efficacy has often
been challenged.' 5 The evidentiary function serves to protect a
contractual writing against perjured or unreliable testimony re-
garding parol terms. The channeling function excludes prior
agreements that have been superseded or merged into the writ-
ing. Despite its name, the Parol Evidence Rule is a substantive
rule of contract interpretation rather than a rule of evidence.' 6
The Parol Evidence Rule therefore applies when the substan-
tive law governing the contract contains a Parol Evidence Rule.
1.2.8. The civil law generally does not have jury trials in civil
cases' 7 and civilian jurisdictions usually do not place limits on
the kind of evidence admissible to prove contracts between
merchants. Though the French Civil Code, for example, incorpo-
rates a version of the Parol Evidence Rule for ordinary con-
tracts,' 8 all forms of proof are generally available against
merchants. 19 In German law, no Parol Evidence Rule exists for
either civil or commercial contracts, though German law
presumes that a contractual writing is accurate and complete.
20
13 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 (1981).
14 For example, the fact that a writing contains detailed specifications does
not create a presumption that it is completely integrated. "This section definitely
rejects ... [any assumption that because a writing has been worked out which is
final on some matters, it is to be taken as including all the matters agreed upon
.." UCC § 2-202 comment 1 (a).
15 John CALAMARI & Joseph PERILLO, Contracts § 3.2 at 123 (4th ed.
1998).
16 See MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino,
S.p.A., 114 F.3d 1384, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1998); E Allan Farnsworth, supra note
11, § 7.2 at 428-30.
17 Max RHEINSTEIN, "Comparative Law-Its Functions, Methods and Us-
ages," 22 Ark. L. Rev. 415, 422 (1968).
18 C.Civ. (Fr.) Art. 1341 (1). See also Italian Codice civile Art. 2722, but see
also Art. 1350.
19 See C.Comm. (Fr.) Art. L. 110-3.
20 See Otto PALANDT (Helmut Heinrichs), Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, § 125
BGB Rn. 15 (64th ed., Munich 2005).
[Vol. 17:61
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This is also the case in other laws, e.g., Japanese law21 and
Scandinavian laws.
1.2.9. Statements, agreements, and conduct that arise after
the conclusion of the writing are treated differently in the dif-
ferent common law systems. In US law, they are not considered
parol evidence and are therefore not barred by the Parol Evi-
dence Rule. 22 English law, on the contrary, attempts to avoid
the situation in which a contract's meaning when concluded
varies at a later date. Therefore, English law does not permit
evidence of the parties' statements or conduct after the conclu-
sion of the contract to impact the issue of contract
interpretation. 23
1.3. The Plain Meaning Rule
Even when the Parol Evidence Rule bars parol evidence for pur-
poses of contradicting or supplementing a contract's terms, pa-
rol evidence is generally still admissible for the purpose of
interpreting terms found in the writing. Nonetheless, a US law
doctrine known as the Plain Meaning Rule, where adopted, bars
extrinsic evidence, particularly evidence of prior negotiations,
for the purposes of interpreting a contract, unless the term in
question has first been found to be ambiguous. In contrast to
the Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule concerns only
contract interpretation and does not purport to bar contradic-
tory or supplementary terms. The Plain Meaning Rule is based
on the proposition that, when language is sufficiently clear, its
meaning can be conclusively determined without recourse to ex-
trinsic evidence. 24 Under the Plain Meaning Rule, the prelimi-
nary analysis concerns whether the contract term in dispute is
21 In Japanese law, no parol evidence rule exists for either civil or commercial
contracts. Japanese law presumes that a contractual writing is accurate and com-
plete. An authentic contractual writing has the evidentiary value of showing that a
contract was concluded as written therein. See e.g, Makoto ITO, Minjisoshoho
[Law of Civil Procedure] (3d ed.), 2004, p.2 6 6 . (or any given commentary/treatise.)]
22 "[Tlhe course of actual performance by the parties is considered the best
indication of what they intended the writing to mean." UCC § 2-202 comment 2.
23 G. H. TREITEL, supra note 8, at 195-6.
24 E. Allan FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 7.12 at 476.
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clear. Only if the term is deemed ambiguous, may evidence of
prior negotiations be admitted for purposes of clarification. 25
1.4. Merger Clauses
The parties may wish to assure themselves that reliance will
not be placed on representations made prior to the execution of
the writing. The Merger or Entire Agreement Clause (the
"Merger Clause") has been developed to achieve certainty in
this regard. The Merger Clause, which usually appears among
the concluding terms of a written agreement, provides that the
writing contains the entire agreement of the parties and that
neither party may rely on representations made outside the
writing. 26
2. The Parol Evidence Rule
The Parol Evidence Rule has not been incorporated into
the CISG. The CISG governs the role and weight to be
ascribed to contractual writing.
2.1. The CISG includes no version of the Parol Evidence Rule.
To the contrary, several CISG provisions provide that state-
ments and other relevant circumstances are to be considered
when determining the effect of a contract and its terms. The
most important of these are Articles 8 and 11.
2.2. Article 11 sentence 2 provides that a party may seek to
prove that a statement has become a term of the contract by any
means, including by the statements of witnesses. Article 8 con-
cerns contract interpretation.2 7 Article 8(1) provides that, in
25 See id. § 7.12.
26 A typical Merger Clause in a sales transaction reads as follows:
Purchaser agrees that the Purchase Order and Sales Contract relating to
this transaction include all of the terms and conditions of this Agreement
and that this Agreement cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and
as of the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of
the terms of the Agreement relating to the subject matters covered
hereby. Purchaser further understands that verbal promises by sales rep-
resentatives are not valid and any promises or understandings not herein
specified in writing are hereby expressly waived by the Purchaser.
27 Most commentators agree that Article 8, which expressly covers the inter-
pretation of a party's statements and conduct, should also be used, mutatis mutan-
dis, to interpret the terms of the contract. John HONNOLD, Uniform Law for
[Vol. 17:61
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certain circumstances, contracts are to be interpreted according
to actual intent. When the inquiry into subjective intent proves
insufficient, Article 8(2) provides that statements and conduct
are to be interpreted from the point of view of a reasonable per-
son. This evaluation according to Article 8(3) takes into account
all relevant circumstances of the case, including the negotia-
tions, any course of conduct or performance between the par-
ties, any relevant usages, and subsequent conduct of the
parties. Thus Article 8 allows that extrinsic evidence may gen-
erally be considered when determining the meaning of a con-
tractual term. In sum, the CISG indicates that a writing is one,
but only one, of many circumstances to be considered when es-
tablishing and interpreting the terms of a contract.28
2.3. The Convention's legislative history is in accord. A ver-
sion of the Parol Evidence Rule was proposed by the Canadian
delegate in Vienna.29 The proposal was justified as a means to
limit admissible evidence in those cases in which the parties
had chosen to reduce their agreement to writing.30 The Aus-
International Sales § 105 (3rd ed. 1999). See also SCHLECHTRIEM &
SCHWENZER (Schmidt-Kessel), Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht -
CISG -, 4. Auflage, Miinchen 2004, N 3, 4 and 32-34; English edition: SCHLECH-
TRIEM & SCHWENZER (Schlechtriem), Commentary on the UN Convention on
the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Art. 8 N 21 (2nd ed., Oxford 2005).
28 J. von STAUDINGER (Ulrich Magnus), Kommentar zum Biurgerlichen
Gesetzbuch, Art. 8 CISG Rn. 24 (Neubearbeitung 1999).
29 "Between the parties to a contract of sale evidenced by a written document,
evidence by witnesses shall be inadmissible for the purposes of confuting or alter-
ing its terms, unless there is prima facie evidence resulting from a written docu-
ment from the opposing party, from his evidence or from a fact the existence of
which has been clearly demonstrated. However, evidence by witnesses shall be ad-
missible for purposes of interpreting the written document." United Nations Con-
ference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf./97/19, U.N. Sales No. E.81.IV.3, at 90 (1981) [hereinafter UNCISG
Official Records], reprinted in John HONNOLD, Documentary History of the Uni-
form Law for International Sales, 662 (1989). For a summary of the legislative
history, see Note, "The Inapplicability of the Parol Evidence Rule to the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods," 28 Hofstra
L. Rev. 799, 823-26 (2000).
30 "Mr. SAMSON (Canada), introducing [this] amendment . .. said that the
aim was to introduce a limitation on admissible evidence in cases where con-
tracting parties had freely chosen to have a written contract. In the international
context, it was important to ensure a minimum of protection for parties who had
made such a choice. The amendment sought to exclude evidence by witnesses un-
less it was supported by other evidence resulting from a written document from
the opposing party or circumstantial evidence. The amendment called for some
20051
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trian Representative indicated that his delegation opposed the
amendment because it "was aimed at limiting the free apprecia-
tion of evidence" by the judge. To prevent a judge from review-
ing all the evidence would violate a "fundamental principle of
Austrian law."31 The Representative from Japan also opposed
the amendment, which he characterized as a "restatement of
the rule on extrinsic evidence which prevailed in English-speak-
ing common-law countries."32 The only other nation to speak in
support of the proposal was Iraq. The amendment received little
support and was rejected. 33
2.4. There were several practical reasons for not including a
Parol Evidence Rule in the CISG.34 First, most of the world's
legal systems admit all relevant evidence in contract litigation.
Secondly, the Parol Evidence Rule, especially as it operates in
the United States, is characterized by great variation and ex-
treme complexity. 35 It has also been the subject of constant
criticism. 36
2.5. Since the Convention has specifically resolved questions
governed by the common law Parol Evidence Rule, there can be
no question of a gap in the CISG, and no grounds for recourse to
non-uniform domestic law. 37 The Parol Evidence Rule therefore
degree of certainty as to facts which could be used to establish a prima facie case:
for example, a clearly established material fact could be adduced as evidence of the
existence of an agreement." UNCISG Official Records, supra note 28, at 270, re-
printed in John HONNOLD, Documentary History, supra note 29, at 491.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Note, "MCC-Marble Ceramic Center: The Parol Evidence Rule and
Other Domestic Law Under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods," 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 351, 360-62.
35 "Few things are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties.... [A] mass
of incongruous matter is here grouped together, and then looked at in a wrong
focus." James THAYER, "The 'Parol Evidence' Rule," 6 Harv. L. Rev. 325, 325
(1893).
36 "The truth is that the [Parol Evidence Rule] does but little to achieve the
ends it supposedly serves." Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 644 (2d Cir.
1943) (Frank, J.).
37 Since the Parol Evidence Rule does not apply when the CISG governs the
contract, there is nothing to be gained, as some scholars have attempted, by decid-
ing which of the various aspects of the Parol Evidence Rule comport with the basic
principles of the CISG. See, e.g., Harry FLECHTNER, "The U.N. Sales Conven-
tion (CISG) and MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino,
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss1/3
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does not apply when the CISG governs a contract.38 US courts
have so held.39
2.6. The leading US case is MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc.
v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A. 40 D'Agostino, the Italian
seller, agreed to sell the buyer, MCC-Marble, a Florida com-
pany, the buyer's requirements in ceramic tile. After MCC-Mar-
ble refused to make certain monthly payments, D'Agostino
S.p.A.: The Eleventh Circuit Weighs in on Interpretation, Subjective Intent, Proce-
dural Limits to the Convention's Scope, and the Parol Evidence Rule," 18 J. L. &
Com. 259, 284 (1999) ("Some aspects of the parol evidence rule... appear to re-
main valid under the Convention"); Note, "The Parol Evidence Rule and the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Justi-
fying Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Business
Center, Inc.," 1995 B.YU. L. Rev. 1347 (1995). Instead, the particular interpretive
method of the CISG must be developed from the text and purposes of the CISG
itself.
38 Most commentators are in accord. See, e.g., Larry DiMatteo, supra note 4,
at 21; John HONNOLD, Uniform Law, supra note 27, § 110; SCHLECHTRIEM &
SCHWENZER (Peter Schlechtriem), Commentary on the UN Convention on the
International Sale of Goods (CISG), Art. 11 N 13 (2nd ed., Oxford 2005) - (German
edition, 4th edition 2004, Art. 11 N 13); Albert KRITZER, Guide to Practical Appli-
cations of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods 94 (1994) ; Bernard AUDIT, La vente internationale de marchandises 43 n. 3
(1990); Note, supra note 33, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 359; Peter WINSHIP, "Domesti-
cating International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C. Article 2 in Light of the
United Nations Sales Convention," 37 Loyola L. Rev. 43, 57 (1991); John MUR-
RAY, "An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods," 8 J.
L. & Comm. 11, 44 (1988) ("CISG rejects the parol evidence rule in the most frugal
terms"). For the contrary view, see Note, supra note 36, 1995 B.YU. L. Rev. at
1351.
39 See MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino,
S.p.A., supra note 16, 114 F.3d at 1392-93 ("The CISG... precludes the applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule, which would otherwise bar the consideration of
evidence concerning a prior or contemporaneously negotiated oral agreement");
Shuttle Packaging Systems, LLC v. Tsonakis, 2001 WL 34046276 (W.D.Mich.
2001) ("international sales agreements under the Convention are not subject to the
parol evidence rule"); Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. European Aircraft Service
AB, 23 F.Supp.2d 915, 919-21 (N.D.Ill. 1998); Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd.,
1998 WL 164824 *5-6 (S.D.N.Y.) ("contracts governed by the CISG are freed from
the limits of the parol evidence rule and there is a wider spectrum of admissible
evidence to consider in construing the terms of the parties' agreement"); Filanto
S.p.A. v. Chilewich International Corp., 789 F.Supp. 1229, 1238 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), app. dismissed, 984 F.2d 58 (2nd Cir. 1993) ("the Convention essentially
rejects . . .the parol evidence rule"). Contra: Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/
Export Corp. v. US Business Center, Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1183 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1993)
(in dictum (the court applied Texas law)).
40 Supra, note 16.
2005]
11
PACE INT'L L. REV.
refused to fill remaining orders. MCC-Marble sued for breach.
D'Agostino defended on the basis of the payment default.
D'Agostino pointed to pre-printed terms on the verso of the
written contract which gave D'Agostino the right to cancel the
agreement if MCC failed to make payment. At trial, MCC-Mar-
ble sought to introduce evidence from the parties' negotiations
to prove that the agreement did not include the pre-printed
terms. The trial court applied the Parol Evidence Rule and
granted summary judgment for the seller. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that the Parol Evidence Rule does not apply
when a contract is governed by the CISG.
2.7. Though the Parol Evidence Rule does not apply to con-
tracts governed by the CISG, similar policy considerations are
incorporated into the CISG itself. The principal purpose of the
Parol Evidence Rule is to respect the importance the parties
may have accorded to their writing. Under the Convention as
well, a writing constitutes an important fact of a transaction - it
must be presumed to fulfill a function, otherwise it would not
have been employed. One of the goals of contract interpretation
is to determine the role the writing was designed to play. The
commentators agree that a contractual writing will often re-
ceive special consideration under the CISG.41
2.8. The special role of a writing, however, must be construed
in accordance with the general principles that govern the CISG.
The parties' intent with regard to the role of their writing is due
the same respect as any other element of their intent. The prin-
ciples of Article 8 are to be used to determine that intent. If the
parties intended their writing as the sole manifestation of their
obligations, prior negotiations and other extrinsic circum-
stances should not be considered during contract interpretation.
41 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER (Schlechtriem), Kommentar zum
Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht - CISG -, 4. Auflage, MUnchen 2004, Art. 11 N 13;
English edition: SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER (Schlechtriem), Commentary
on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Art. 11 N 13 (2nd
ed., Oxford 2005). ("that does not preclude the existence of a 'preference' for evi-
dence of declarations in written form"); John HONNOLD, Uniform Law, supra
note 27, § 110 ("Jurists interpreting agreements subject to the Convention can be
expected to continue to give special and, in most cases, controlling effect to detailed
written agreements").
[Vol. 17:61
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss1/3
CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL OPINION NO. 3
However, Articles 8 and 11 express the general principle that
writings are not to be presumed to be "integrations".4
2
3. Plain Meaning Rule
In some common law jurisdictions, the Plain Meaning
Rule prevents a court from considering evidence outside
a seemingly unambiguous writing for purposes of con-
tractual interpretation. The Plain Meaning Rule does not
apply under the CISG.
3.1. The majority jurisdictions in the United States retain
some version of the Plain Meaning rule in their common law,
though it has been rejected by other of the United States as well
as by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,4 3 and the Uniform
Commercial Code.44 The UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts also reject the Plain Meaning Rule, by
providing that, even in the presence of a Merger Clause, prior
statements or agreements may be used to interpret a writing.4 5
3.2. Article 8 specifies the Convention's method for contract
interpretation. As a general rule, Article 8 mandates that all
facts and circumstances of the case, including the parties' nego-
tiations, are to be considered during the course of contract inter-
pretation. The writing constitutes one of those factors, and
though always important, it is not the exclusive factor. Words
42 Harry FLECHTNER, supra note 37, 18 J. L. & Comm. at 278-79 ("the ques-
tion whether the parties intended a writing to be an integration must be resolved
like any other question of intent under the CISG, and without benefit of a pre-
sumption that the writing is an integration").
43 "It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain mean-
ing of a writing, but meaning can almost never be plain except in a context.... Any
determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the
relevant evidence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of
the transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of
trade, and the course of dealing between the parties.... But after the transaction
has been shown in all its length and breadth, the words of an integrated agree-
ment remain the most important evidence of intention." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 212 comment b (1981).
4 "This section definitely rejects ... [tihe premise that the language used has
the meaning attributable to such language by rules of construction existing in the
law rather than the meaning which arises out of the commercial context in which
it was used .... " UCC § 2-202 comment 1 (b).
45 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts Art. 2.1.17 (2nd
sentence).
2005]
13
PACE INT'L L. REV [Vol. 17:61
are almost never unambiguous. 46 Moreover, the application of
the Plain Meaning Rule would impede one of the basic goals of
contract interpretation under the CISG, which is to focus on the
parties' actual intent. If contract terms are deemed to be unam-
biguous, the Plain Meaning Rule would prevent presentation of
other proof of the parties' intent.47
3.3. Under the CISG, therefore, the fact that the meaning of
the writing seems unambiguous does not bar recourse to extrin-
sic evidence to assist in ascertaining the parties' intent.
4. Merger Clause
A Merger Clause, also referred to as an Entire Agreement
Clause, when in a contract governed by the CISG, dero-
gates from norms of interpretation and evidence con-
tained in the CISG. The effect may be to prevent a party
from relying on evidence of statements or agreements
not contained in the writing. Moreover, if the parties so
intend, a Merger Clause may bar evidence of trade
usages.
However, in determining the effect of such a Merger
Clause, the parties' statements and negotiations, as well
as all other relevant circumstances shall be taken into
account.
46 One can never preclude the possibility that, by agreement of the parties
,usages of trade or commercial sense, ordinary words are given a special meaning.
For the same reason there cannot be any such thing as a wholly unambiguous
contract term, despite the supposed rule that reference may be made to extrinsic
evidence only where there is ambiguity. Among bakers, apparently, a dozen means
thirteen. More significantly, the House of Lords in The Antaios [19851 AC 191 up-
held an arbitral award which construed "breach" as meaning "fundamental
breach" to give commercial sense to the contract, even though "breach" is wholly
unambiguous.
47 "When a contract is unambiguous, the court must . . .give effect to the
contract as written, the duty of the court being to declare the meaning of what was
written in the instrument, not what was intended to be written." Vol 11 Samuel
WILLISTON, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 30:6 at 80-83 (Richard Lord ed.,
4th ed. 1999). For a critique of the Plain Meaning Rule, see Vol 5 Arthur CORBIN
(Margaret Kniffen), Contracts § 24.7 (rev. ed. 1998).
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4.1. When the parties agree to a Merger Clause, 48 its effect
may be to derogate under Article 6 from norms of interpretation
and evidence contained in the CISG. In this regard Merger
Clauses have two objectives. 49 The first objective is to bar ex-
trinsic evidence that would otherwise supplement or contradict
the terms of the writing.50 Such Merger Clauses mainly dero-
gate from Article 11, which provides that a sales contract may
be proved by any means, including witnesses. The second objec-
tive is to prevent recourse to extrinsic evidence for the purpose
of contract interpretation. This objective would constitute a der-
ogation from the Convention's canons of interpretation incorpo-
rated in Article 8. Under the CISG the extent to which a Merger
Clause accomplishes one or both of these purposes is a question
of interpretation of this clause.
4.2. Several issues in relation to Merger Clauses are dealt
with in international uniform law instruments, such as the
UNIDROIT Principles 51 and the Principles of European Con-
tract Law. 52
4.3. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts expressly recognize Merger Clauses. Under the
UNIDROIT Principles, though prior statements and agreements
may not be used to contradict or supplement a writing that con-
tains a Merger Clause, such statements and agreements may be
used for purposes of interpreting the contract.
4.4. Article 2:105 of the Principles of European Contract Law
distinguishes between Merger Clauses that result from individ-
ual negotiation and those that do not. If the Merger Clause is
individually negotiated, prior statements, undertakings or
agreements that are not embodied in the writing do not form
part of the contract. If it has not been individually negotiated,
the Merger Clause merely establishes a presumption that the
48 For an example see note 27 supra.
49 See, e.g., C. M. BIANCA & M. J. BONELL (E. Allan Farnsworth), Commen-
tary on the International Sales Law Art. 8 § 3.3 at 102 (1987).
50 For "writing" see CISG-AC Opinion no 1 - http://www.cisg.law.pace.edul
cisg/CISG-AC-opl.html
51 See Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts Article
2.1.17
52 See Article 2:105.
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prior statements and agreements were not intended to become
part of the contract. The presumption may be rebutted.5 3 Fur-
thermore, the European Principles provide that a party may, by
its statements or conduct, be precluded from asserting a Merger
Clause to the extent that the other party has reasonably relied
on those statements or that conduct.
4.5. The CISG does not deal with Merger Clauses and there-
fore does not contain similar distinctions. Indeed, the dividing
line may be blurred. Under the CISG there is authority for the
proposition that a properly worded Merger Clause bars the con-
sideration of extrinsic evidence. 54 However, extrinsic evidence
should not be excluded, unless the parties actually intended the
Merger Clause to have this effect. The question is to be resolved
by reference to the criteria enunciated in Article 8, without ref-
erence to national law. Article 8 requires an examination of all
relevant facts and circumstances when deciding whether the
Merger Clause represents the parties' intent.
4.6. Under the CISG, a Merger Clause does not generally have
the effect of excluding extrinsic evidence for purposes of con-
tract interpretation. However, the Merger Clause may prevent
recourse to extrinsic evidence for this purpose if specific word-
ing, together with all other relevant factors, make clear the par-
ties' intent to derogate from Article 8 for purposes of contract
interpretation. 55
53 "It often happens that parties use standard form contracts containing a
merger clause to which they pay no attention. A rule under which such a clause
would always prevent a party from invoking prior statements or undertakings
would be too rigid and often lead to results which were contrary to good faith."
Principles of European Contract Law Article 2:105 Comment.
54 See, e.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino,
S.p.A., supra note 16, 114 F.3d at 1391 ("to the extent parties wish to avoid parol
evidence problems they can do so by including a merger clause in their agreement
that extinguishes any and all prior agreements and understandings not expressed
in the writing"); John HONNOLD, Uniform Law, supra note 27, § 110 (1) ("con-
tract terms (often called 'integration clauses') that any contemporaneous or prior
agreement shall be without effect would be supported by Article 6"); Bernard AU-
DIT, supra note 38, at 43 n. 3 (1990) ("la clause relativement fr6quente selon la-
quelle seul l'6crit souscrit par les parties doit 6tre pris en consideration A
'exclusion de tout autre 6l6ment ... devrait recevoir effet en vertu de l'art. 6");
Larry DIMATTEO, supra note 4, at 215-16.
55 See John MURRAY, supra note 38, 8 J. L. & Comm. at 45 ("the typical
merger clause familiar to American lawyers may be insufficient for this purpose.
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4.7. Article 9 requires a court or tribunal to consider a number
of factors when determining whether usages have been agreed
or trade practices have been established between the parties. A
Merger Clause generally will not be held to exclude trade us-
ages relevant under Article 9(1) or established practices con-
cerning the implicit background of the transaction unless those
usages and practices are specifically mentioned.
At least some explicit reference to the parties' intention to derogate from Article
8(3) through Article 6 would provide a safer course").
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